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JUDICIAL REGULATION OF COURT PROCEDURE'
ANCIENTLY, regulations of pleading and practice were principally of judicial origin. Some were the result of judicial
decisions in individual cases; others were court rules formally
declared;2 some few were enactments of parliament, the latter
of which were attempts to mitigate some of the most technical
1 In preparation of this paper the following were freely consulted,
and material therefrom has been liberally used:
Procedure through Rules of Court. I Journal of American Judicature Society 17 (June 1917).
The Proposed Regulation of Missouri Procedure by Rules of
Court, Manley 0. Hudson. University of Missouri Bulletin, Law Series
13, p. 3 (Dec. 1916).
Regulation of Judicial Procedure by Rules of Court, Roscoe Pound.
10 Ill. Law. Rev. 163; 2 Amer. Bar Association Journal 46 (Oct. 1915).
Ontario Courts and Procedure, Herbert Harley. 12 Mich. Law
Rev. 339-447 (March-April 1914).
English Courts and Procedure, William E. Higgins. Bulletin 11,
Amer. Jud. Society 32.
A Criticism of the Colorado Act for Procedure by Rules of Court
(Laws of Colorado 1913, p. 447), E. L. Regennitter. 18 Col. Bar Association Reports 131.
Procedure by Rules of Court. 83 Central Law Journal 394 (1916).
Reforming Procedure by Rules of Court, Roscoe Pound. 76 Central Law Journal 211 (1913).
Report of Committee on Reform of Judicial Procedure. 28 Va.
State Bar Association Reports 71 (1915).
Report of Board of Statutory Consolidation, New York. Vol. I
p. 170 et seq. (1915).
Committee Report, 37 Ohio State Bar Association Reports 18.
Rosenbaum, Rule-Making Authority in the English Supreme Court.
Boston, 1917.
Studies in English Civil Procedure, Samuel Rosenbaum. 63 University
of Pennsylvania Law Rev. 105, 151, 273, 380, 505.
2
Jenks, Short History of English Law 188.
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of the asperities of common law pleading. By the beginning
of the nineteenth century the rules of common law pr6cedure
had become so rigid and formal that some relief, other than
from the courts themselves was imperative. In England it
took the form of the civil procedure act of 1833, which provided for the formulating of rules by the common law judges
for the simplification of pleading and practice. The Hilary Rules
of 1834 were accordingly promulgated. In this country various
statutory modifications of the ancient rules were enacted. The
early experiences of England under the Hilary Rules and the
experience generally with patchwork procedural reform led to
the adoption of the Field Code in New York in 1848. Whereas
the English act of 1833, while commanding simplification, left
with the judiciary the methods of accomplishing it, the New
York experiment effectuated a practically complete transfer
of procedural regulation from the courts to the legislature.
The Field Code has been widely copied and is the basis of
most of the systems of procedure in our country today. The
American Bar Association is now advocating a system of
uniform judicial procedure, the first step in which requires
the enactment by the Congress of the United States of the
provisions of the so-called Clayton Bill as introduced in the
sixty-third Congress. That bill provides that the Supreme
Court of the United States shall have "the power to prescribe,
from time to time, and in any manner, the forms of writs and
all process, the mode and manner of framing and filing proceedings and pleadings, of giving notice and serving writs
and process of all kinds, of taking and obtaining evidence,
drawing up, entering and enrolling orders; and generally to
regulate and prescribe by rule the forms for and the kind
and character of the entire pleading, practice and procedure
to be used in all actions, motions and proceedings at law of
whatever nature by the district courts of the United States
and the courts of the District of Columbia; that in prescribing
such 'rules, the Supreme Court shall have regard to the simplification of the system of pleading, practice and procedure in
said courts, so as to promote the speedy determination of
litigation on the merits," and that, when and as the rules of
court shall be promulgated, all laws in conflict therewith shall
become of no force or effect. It is planned to have similar
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statutes enacted in the several states and to have rules adopted
thereunder conforming to those promulgated by the Supreme
Court of the United States. In short, it is proposed to revest
the control of procedure in the courts, but to prescribe that it
shall be exercised by rules formally promulgated rather than
by regulations evolved through judicial decisions.
The sole object of any procedure system should be the attainment of a just and speedy decision upon the merits, according to the principles of substantive law, at the lowest practicable cost, of all disputes between litigants. The attainment
of this end is possible only under a plan which recognizes -the
impossibility of foreseeing the effects of the application of any
procedural rule in all contingencies, and the impossibility of
devising a code which will cover every procedural contingency.
Consequently, a satisfactory system must be flexible and must
provide an easy method for wise amendment. Other things
being equal, the object is more likely to be attained if the rules
are made by those best qualified by learning and experience
to appreciate the practical problems of the administration of
justice. Fairness demands that, so far as practicable, authority
to cure procedural defects and popular responsibility therefor
should be with the same body. And obviously any suggested
change should be workable, should promise improvement over
the existing system and should be practicable of adoption.
The present proposal, therefore, involves a comparison of the
present system and the suggested plan as to flexibility, ease of
amendment, and qualifications of the respective rule-making
bodies, and the consideration of popular responsibility for
faults in the administration of justice, and of the practicability
of the proposed system.
Legislative control of the details of procedure is based upon
the obviously erroneous theory that the courts can be furnished a set of rigid orders, devised in advance by a farseeing
legislature, to fit every possible circumstance, so that in any
case the court has but to select the particular rule designed
therefor, which will automatically apply. This results in an
absolutely rigid system. The courts can, of course, do much
to soften the rigor by process of interpretation, if they be so
inclined, but they cannot properly disregard or suspend positive statutory enactments, even to avoid an outrageous result.
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Rules of court, however, may be waived, or their operation
suspended, to prevent a manifest injustice. ' As to flexibility,
the advantage, therefore, is clearly with the proposal.
I The same is true with reference to amendment. Legislative amendment is difficult because legislative sessions are
infrequent, are overcrowded with business, and are of limited
duration. Furthermore, it is nobody's duty to bring to the
attention of the legislature in the proper way, procedural
matters needing amendment. The attorney who has found
the code inadequate or ambiguous, or positively misleading
in some particular, forgets it as soon as the case involving it
is disposed of; and no one takes the time to anticipate troublesome questions of pleading or practice. Legislative amendment is usually unscientific, because the bills are not carefully
drawn, or if carefully drawn, are carelessly amended in committee or upon the floor; because frequently a rule is enacted
or altered without sufficient consideration of its effect upon
other portions of the code, and because bills are sometimes
passed as personal favors to meet individual cases. Under a
system of procedural regulation by rule of court, on the other
hand, the rule-making body is in almost continuous session, is always available and may issue its regulations at any
time. Suggestions for amendments may be made by attorneys and trial judges, as and when difficulties in pleading
and practice arise. Many such matters can be anticipated.
The court will have accessible the whole body of procedural
law, and can easily consider the effect thereon of any proposed
change. Being under no restriction as to time, and having in
mind the necessity of interpreting the rules, it may and
should insist upon careful drafting and accurate phrasing. It
will be under no temptation to make regulations as personal
favors to give advantages to favored counsel or litigants, but
will be much more amenable to suggestion by the bar than
is the legislature.
It would seem too clear for argument, that judges are in
a much better position than legislators to know and appreciate
the practical problems of administration of justice. The rules
of pleading and practice are the tools of their trade. They
3United States v. Breiling, (1887) 20 How. (U. S.) 252, at 254, 15
L. Ed. 900; Gillette-Herzog Mfg. Co. v. Asliton. (1893) 55 Minn. 75,
56 N. W. 576; Picket v. Wallace et al., (1880) 54 Cal. 147.
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must use them every day. And 'as the skilled workman knows
the defects in his tools, and the difficulties and the imperfections in the product caused thereby, so the judges, much more
clearly than any legislative body, know the inconsistencies and
shortcomings of many procedural regulations and the effects
thereof in the delay and denial of justice. And with this
knowledge they are obviously better qualified to devise the
remedies in the way of new or altered rules.
People generally are impatient of the workman who complains of his tools. And during the past decade or more the
public, has paid little attention to the plea that delays and
miscarriages of justice are due to legislative stupidities, and
has placed the responsibility upon the courts, with the result
that, constitutional provisions and statutes in several jurisdictions were enacted providing for the recall of judges. The
courts and the lawyers know that much of the criticism
heaped upon the courts belongs, rightfully to the legislature;
but the public does not know it, and can with difficulty, ever
be made to believe it. If the courts are to bear the responsibility for the defects in the machinery or the administration
of justice, theirs should be the authority to design and repair
that machinery.
Theoretically, then, the proposed revesting of the control
of procedure in the courts has everything to commend it.
What of its practicability? It has been said that it could not
work worse than the present system. And in fact, legislative
control has produced some well-nigh intolerable results. The
original codes have generally been inadequate, have been
variously interpreted and have been voluminously and carelessly amended. The Field Code contained fewer than four
hundred sections'; the present code of New York, without the
1917 amendments, contains more than thirty-four hundred
sections. With its annotations it covers some five thousand
pages: The experience has doubtless been worse in New
York than elsewhere; but it has been bad enough everywhere.
A great portion of the time and energy of the trial and appellate courts is consumed in determining mere questions of
practice. Mr. Frank C. Smith prepared for the American Bar
Association a table covering the general digest for the first
three months of 1910, showing the number of points on prac-
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tice and on substantive law decided by the courts. 4 In a total
of 5927 cases, a total of 22,986 points were decided, of which
12,259 or 53.32% were points on practice. In Minnesota, of
332 points, decided in 115 cases, 183 or 55.1% were points on
practice. 5 These figures show the vast amount of time, labor
and money expended on matters not going to the merits. They
do not purport to show the perceftage of cases lost in the
trial courts, or reversed in appellate courts on points of practice. It must not be taken that in all of these cases justice was
denied or even delayed by procedural faults. In many of them,
such was doubtless the fact. But even if it were not so in
a single case, the waste of work and money involved in making
the points, preparing the records and briefs, and making
and writing the decisions, is sufficient to bring condemnation
upon the system. Such a mass of procedural litigation must
tcnd to develop the procedural specialist, whose aim is to win
upon technicalities and to prevent adjudication upon the
merits. And the development of such specialists in turn tends
to increase the amount of procedural litigation. Thus the
evil grows upon itself.
Past experience with judicial regulation of procedure has
not been uniformly satisfactory. Indeed, the failure of the
courts to show a proper appreciation of the true function of
rules of pleading and practice was the chief cause for legislative interference. It must be remembered, however, that
most of these rules were developed by judicial decision, as
were the principles of substantive law, and the doctrine of
stare decisis was applied to them. Consequently, they became practically as formal and rigid as legislative enactments.
Regulation by rule of court will, of course, not be subject to
this objection. And such data as are available with reference
to the practical operation of regulation of this sort, while far
from demonstrating its perfection, do indicate the possibility of
its producing much more satisfactory results than the present
system.
Procedure has been regulated by rules of court in England
4West Publishing Co.'s Docket, II. p. 1752, 1753.

5At the 1917 meeting of the Minnesota State Bar Association, Hon.
William A. Cant, Judge of St. Louis County District Court, voiced his
protest against the use of so great amount of time and energy of court
and counsel upon points not going to the merits.
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since before 1875,6 in Ireland since 1877, and in Scotland since
the sixteenth century. 7 Our federal courts have controlled
-equity practice by rule since 1822, 8 admiralty practice since
1842, 9 bankruptcy since 1898, 10 and copyright since 1909. 1
New Hampshire courts have exercised such rights of regulation since before 1859. 12 The courts of Michigan have had
the constitutional power to do so since 1850; " those of Delaware, statutory authority since 1852.14 The various commissions and courts treated to handle such matters as workmen's compensation, railroad and warehouse affairs, etc., are
generally given power to prescribe their own rules of procedure. The municipal courts of Chicago and Cleveland have
enjoyed a somewhat restricted privilege of the same sort.
Until 1909, however, no particular stress seems to have been
laid upon the right and duty of American courts to work out
their own procedural salvation. In that year the Committee
of the American Bar Association to Suggest Remedies and
Formulate Proposed Laws to Prevent Delay and Unnecessary
Cost in Litigation pointed out the desirability of such a program.

In

1912 New Jersey, 15 in 191-3 Colorado, ", in 1915

19
Alabama, Michigan,' and Vermont, and in 1916 Virginia 20
enacted practice codes upon this principle. The Colorado,
17

6 Common Law Procedure Acts were enacted in 1852 and 1854, and
Judicature Acts in 1873, 1875, 1877, 1879, 1881, 1884, 1890, 1891, 1899,

1902, 1909, 1910. See Proposed Regulation of Missouri Procedure,
Manley 0. Hudson, University of Missouri Bulletin, Law Series 13,

p. 18.
7Ibid., pp. 19, 20; Rosenbaum, Rule Making in' the Courts of the
Empire, 15 Jour. Comp. Legislation (N. S.) 128, 132, Rosenbaum. RuleMaking Authority, 228.
8 1 U.S. Statutes at Large 276. See rules in 7 Wheat. (U. S.) pp.
v-xxiv.
9 See rules in 1 How. (U. S.) pp. xli-lxx. The Act of 1842, Chap.
188, confirmed the court's power. 5 U. S. Statutes at Large 516.
10 National Bankruptcy Act, 1898, Sec. 30. 30 U. S. Statutes at
Large 552. See rules in 172 U. S. 653.
1135 U. S. Statutes at Large 1075 Chap. 320 Sec. 25. See rules in
214 U. S. 533.
12Jeremiah Smith, in 10 Ill. Law Rev. 364. See also Owen v.
Weston, (1885) 63 N. H. 599, 604.
13 Mich. Constitution, 1850. Art. VI. Sec. 5.
14 Del. Revised Code 1852 Chap. 106.
See also N.J. Acts 1915
15 N.J. Acts 1912 Chap. 231 See. 32.
Chap. 93.
1a Col. Laws 1913 Chap. 121.
17 Ala. Laws. 1915 p. 607.
18 Mich, Public Acts 1915 No. 314 Sec. 14, Mich. Judicature Act
1915 p. 5.
19
20 Vt. Laws 1915 No. 90 See. 10.
Va. Acts 1916 p. 939.
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Vermont, Virginia and Alabama enactments place in the courts
the control of procedure almost without restriction, as does
the English act. The New Jersey plan provides a short legislative code covering in outline the general principles of practice and leaving details to be cared for by rules of courts.
It is apparent that it is too early to make accurate deductions from the American experience. Prior to 1909, the possibilities of procedural progress by court rules was not realized.
The courts of Michigan had taken no advantage of their authority to regulate procedure by rule. The Supreme Court of
the United States in its dealings with equity practice rivalled
the average legislature. The old equity rules were almost as
badly drawn and as fruitful of litigation as the ordinary procedural statute; and no substantial amendment after 1842 was
made, notwithstanding the fact that even their phraseology
had become obsolescent.
Furthermore, judicial regulation
made no gain by the promulgation of the 1914 rules of the
supreme court of Colorado. They were inartistically drawn,
inaccurately phrased, and in some respects unwisely enacted. 21
In fact they seemed to offer absolutely no improvement over
the usual legislative act. On the other hand, the federal supreme court in 1913, of its own motion, made a thorough and
satisfactory revision of the equity rules. The Colorado court
was quick to appreciate the criticisms of the bar and to respond by amending and revising its rules. 22 But it is the
working of the English system that proves the superiority
of court regulation over legislative regulation. The rules are,
on the whole, accurately worded and carefully drawn. They
are readily but not hastily amended, as experience in applying them shows the need of amendment. 23 They are administered with due regard to the fact that their purpose is the
attainment of adjudication upon the merits. Thus, reliance
upon technicalities is discouraged, and the law of procedure
is relegated to its proper place. The result is that American
lawyers, who see the system in operation, are astonished at
the rapidity and accuracy with which the merits of a case
are presented for decision. This end, of course, could not be
21 See 18 Col. Bar Ass'n Reports 131 et seq.
22 See 1 Journal of American Judicature Society 17.
23 See Rosenbaum, Studies in English Procedure, 63

Law Rev. 111.

Univ. of Pa.
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attained without a proper attitude of both bench and bar. -If
the court did not appreciate the tremendous responsibility
and opportunity given it in the right to control procedure and
did not take the proper steps for a wise and scientific exercise of that right; if the bar did not unselfishly and intelligently
lend its aid to the court, the English system would function
as badly as our own.
It is believed that the American bench and bar have come
to realize the folly of making a fetich of procedure, the stupidity of sacrificing merits to technicalities, and the importance of a proper making and interpreting of rules of pleading
and practice. Of course, where courts are so constituted
intellectually as to reverse a conviction because the indictment
concludes "against the peace and dignity of state," instead of
"against the peace and dignity of the state," 24 or to reverse a
judgment on the merits because the complaint uses the word
"promise" instead of the word "agree," 25 counsel will continue
to raise such senseless objections; and relief will be had not
in the adoption of the new system of procedure, but in the
appointment or election of new judges. It is noteworthy that
when decisions of this kind are now announced, they are accompanied by profuse apologies, and attempts to place the
blame upon the legislature or upon the doctrine of stare decisis.
The attitude of the majority of the courts is well illustrated
by the language of the Minnesota supreme court in dealing with
the matter of inconsistent defenses in the McAlpine case :26
"We are not so much concerned with the development of
an artistic and symmetrical system of pleading as we are with
having a practical procedure which will result in a speedy
determination of disputes upon the facts.
"...When the rule of consistency, technically applied, pre-

vents the interposition of a fair defense, it must yield to the,
insistent demand of the law that a party be given a hearing
on all his causes of action and all his defenses. This is the
parar0ount consideration. Substantive rights must not be sacrificed to preserve a rule no more important and no better accredited than the consistency rule."
24
25
28

State v. Campbell, (1907) 210 Mo. 202, 109 S.W. 706.
McGinnity v. Laguerenne, (1848) 10 Ill. 101.
McAlpine v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York, (1916) 134

Minn. 192, 200, 158 N. W. 967.

See also 1 MiNNEsoTA

LAw RE IEw

94.
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With the courts taking this position, with the bar realizing
its justice and good policy, with the public calling for simplification and expedition of court procedure, and with both
bench and bar recognizing the need and their responsibility,
there would seem to be no reason why the proposed plan
should not work here as well as in England.
But even though it is theoretically sound and practicable,
is its adoption feasible? It has been objected that the present
system while cumbersome and inartistic is fairly well understood, and that to substitute a new one will cause a tremendous
increase in procedural litigation; that in the first fifteen years
under the English Judicature Act some four thousand decisions
dealt with the interpretation of rules.2 T It is answered that
the present system is not sufficiently understood to avoid
constant litigation, and that there is no necessity for sudden
and complete change in procedure. The court might well prescribe that the procedure shall remain as formerly except
where specifically changed. Then changes might be made
gradually, beginning with those matters most urgently calling for alteration.
It is also objected that the adoption of such a plan calls
for a constitutional amendment, and that in most jurisdictions
it would be quite impossible to secure its adoption, because
of the difficulties in the way of all constitutional amendments,
and particularly because of the unfamiliarity of the public with
the merits of the plan. In considering this objection, attention must be given to the particular method of accomplishing the desired result.
The method suggested by the American Judicature Society
involves the reorganization of our entire judicial system, and
places control of procedure in a judicial council composed of
representatives of the different branches of a single state
court. 28 This would clearly require an amendment to the constitution and the adoption of a project for which extensive
propaganda would be necessary.
Another suggestion makes the rule-making body a committee of bench and bar. This committee would, of course,
be separate from both the legislature and the courts; and
27 Hepburn, History of Code Pleading, Sec. 224.
28

1 Journal of Amer. judicature Society 17.
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powers either judicial or legislative would have to be delegated to it. This might well be subject to constitutional
objection.
The suggestion of the American Bar Association is to vest
the rule-making power for all the courts of a jurisdiction in
the court of last resort of that jurisdiction. This proposal
has been opposed for the practical reasons, that courts of last
resort are usually overworked, that some of their members
have never been either trial judges or trial lawyers, that none
of them are likely to be very familiar with the offices and
0
duties of masters, referees, clerks 2 and for the further
reason that the legislature has no right to delegate to the
judiciary the legislative function of prescribing rules of procedure. The practical objections are overcome by pointing
out that the appellate courts can do as the federal supreme
court did in preparing the revision of the equity rules. They
can get whatever assistance they need from committees of trial
judges and attorneys. Indeed the various bar associations
would be glad to cooperate with the courts, and there would
be no difficulty whatever in getting aid from any of the officers
of any court in the jurisdiction.
As to the constitutional objection, it is true that most of
our state constitutions provide for a separation of powers between the legislative, executive and judicial departments, and
forbid the exercise of the powers of any department. But in
the application of this provision the following well-settled
propositions must be borne in mind: (1) While such a separation of powers seems theoretically sound, yet in the practical
operation of government, it is absolutely impossible. As Mr.
Justice Story said:
"Notwithstanding the memorable terms in which this
maxim of a division of powers is incorporated into the bills of
rights of many of our state constitutions, the same mixture will
be found provided for, and indeed, required in the same solemn
instruments of government..... Indeed, there is not a single
constitution of any state in the Union which does.not practically embrace some acknowledgment of the maxim and at the
same time some admixture of powers constituting an exception
to it." 30
29

Ibid.

30 Story, Constitution of the United States, 5th ed., I, Sec. 527.
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(2) This provision does not prevent the legislature from
delegating to the courts all powers which the legislature
might rightfully exercise itself, but only those powers which
are strictly and exclusively legislative. 11 (3) The assignment
of powers not specifically distributed by the constitution is
a legislative function, and when powers of an ambiguous
character are assigned to the judiciary, any doubt will be
resolved in favor of the validity of the statute. 32 (4) In
determining whether a particular power belongs exclusively
to a particular department, regard must be had to its history
and especially to the exercise of it at and prior to the adoption
of the constitution. 33
From the foregoing it would seem to follow that if the
history of judicial procedure shows the power to regulate it to
have been exercised by the courts exclusively, or by the courts
and the legislature in common, there can be no constitutional
objection to vesting such power in the judiciary by legislative
enactment.
As already stated, the regulation of procedure was in
England, from the earliest times, regarded as chiefly a judicial
function. At the time of our separation from the Mother
Country, parliament had rarely interfered, although its power
to do so was undoubted. The theory of all later English
legislation, beginning with the civil procedure act of 1833,
is that the courts should largely control their own procedure. 34
That the theory of our early federal legislation was the
same appears from the large measure of control of procedure
placed in the courts by the Judiciary Act of 1789 and the
Process Act of 1792. That the Supreme Court and the bar
accepted the same principle is evidenced by the fact that the
attorney general in 1792 moved the court for information
relative to the system of practice to be used therein and the
court responded that it considered "the practice of the courts
of King's Bench and Chancery in England, as affording outlines for the practice of this court; and that they will, from
time to time, make such alterations therein, as circumstances
31

Wayman v. Southard, (1825) 10 Wheat. 1, 42. 6 L. Ed. 253.
82 State ex rel. Patterson v. Bates, (1905) 96 Minn. 110, 116, 104

N. 33
W. 709, 113 Am. St. Rep. 612.
State v. Harmon, (1877) 31 Ohio St. 250, 258.
34 See enactments referred to in note 6, supra.
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In 1825, Chief Justice Marshall

"The 17th section of the Judiciary Act, and the 7th section
of the additional act empower the courts respectively to regulate their practice. It certainly will not be contended that this
might not be done by Congress.
"The courts, for example, may make rules, directing the
returning of writs and processes, the filing of declarations and
other pleadings, and other things of the same description. It
will not be contended that these things might not be done by
the legislature, without the intervention of the courts, yet it is
not alleged that the power may not be conferred upon the
judicial department." 31
In the same year, Mr. Justice Thompson declared: "Congress might regulate the whole practice of the courts, if it was
deemed expedient so to do; but this power is vested in the
courts; and it never has occurred to anyone that it was a
delegation of legislative power."37
Ten years later Mr. Justice Story referred to the cases in
which these statements were made and said:
"It was there held that this delegation of power by Congress was perfectly constitutional; that the power to alter and
add to the process and modes of proceeding in a suit embraced
the whole progress of the suit, and every transaction in it
from its commencement to its termination, and until the judgment should be satisfied; and that it authorized the courts to
prescribe and regulate the conduct of the officer in the execution of final process, in giving effect to its judgment. And
it was emphatically laid down, that 'a general superintendence
over this subject seems to be properly within the judicial province and has always been so considered.' ")38
The court's action in regulating equity practice, and the
subsequent legislation and court rules regarding admiralty,
bankruptcy and copyright practice are in harmony with the
earlier history. It is, therefore, apparent that both in England
and in our federal governmental system, the regulation of
procedure has not been regarded as an exclusively legislative
function.
335
8 2 Dall. (U. S.) 411, 1 L. Ed. 436.

Wayman v. Southard, (1825) 10 Wheat. (U. S.) 1, 43, 6 L. Ed.

253.

37 U.

264.3 8

S. Bank v. Halstead, (1825) 10 Wheat. (U. S.) 51, 61, 6 L. Ed.

Beers v. Haughton, (1835) 9 Pet. (U. S.) 329, 359, 9 L. Ed. 145.
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And such has been its history in Minnesota also. In the
Northwest Ordinance of 1787 and the act of August 17, 1789,
to provide for the government of the Northwest Territory, '9
there was no original separation of powers, for the governor
and judges had legislative powers until the organization of
a general assembly.
In 1800 Indiana Territory was carved
out of the Northwest Territory, 40 and in 1805 Michigan Territory was carved out of Indiana Territory. 41

In December,

1820, the governor and judges of Michigan Territory adopted
an act concerning the supreme and county courts of the
territory, section 12 of which gave the courts power to make
"all such rules respecting the trial and conduct of business
both in term and vacation, as the discretion of said court
shall dictate," and in order that the rules might be uniform
the county courts were directed to make their rules conform
as near as might be to the rules of the supreme court. 42
In 1825 the general assembly enacted a more elaborate bill,
section 18 of which made it the duty of the supreme court to
prescribe rules and orders for the proper conducting of business in said court and in the circuit courts and for the regulating of the practice of said courts, "so as shall be fit and
necessary for the advancement of justice, and especially for
preventing delay in proceedings." A direction to the county
courts similar to that contained in the former act was made
for the sake of securing uniformity. 43
This law was in force when, in 1836, Wisconsin Territory
was established by an act which, among other things, continued the laws of Michigan Territory in force until changed
by the proper authorities. 44 . The policy of regulating the
practice of the supreme and circuit courts by rules adopted by
the supreme court was continued in the legislation of the state
of Michigan.

4,

And in 1850 a similar provision was written

into the constitution of Michigan.
39 1 U. S. Statutes at Large 50.

U. S. Statutes at Large 58.
U. S. Statutes at Large 309.
42 Mich. Territory Laws, I, 714, 718.
43 Mich. Territory Laws, II, 264, 268.
44 5 U. S. Statutes at Large 10.
45 Mich. Rev. Statutes 1838, Part III Title 1 Chap. 1 Sec. 5; Mich.
Rev. Statutes 1846 Chap. 88 Sec. 13.
46 See note 13, supra.
402

412
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In 1836 the legislative assembly of Wisconsin Territory
passed an act concerning the supreme and district courts
which, in terms almost identical with those of the Michigan
enactment of 1820, conferred upon the courts the power to
make rules, and directed the district courts to conform their
rules to those of the supreme court. 47 When Wisconsin was
admitted to the Union in 1848, this act was in force. The
above-mentioned provision was continued in Section 2 of
Chapter 87 of the Revised Statutes of 1849; and Section 4 of
Chapter 82 gave the supreme court power to make rules for
the circuit courts also. Because in 1856 a code of procedure
was adopted in Wisconsin, this latter section appears in Chapter 115 of the Revised Statutes of 1858 with the qualifying
clause requiring the rules to be "not inconsistent with the
constitution and the laws."
The act of March 3, 1849, which established the territory
of Minnesota provided that the laws in force in the territory
of Wisconsin at the date of the admission of the state of
Wisconsin should continue valid and operative in Minnesota. 48
This clearly made the Wisconsin act of 1836 part of the laws of
Minnesota Territory. In 1851, Minnesota Territory adopted a
code of civil procedure. At the same time it gave the supreme
court power to prescribe rules for the conduct of its business.
In 1852, Section 6 of Chapter 69 of the Revised Statutes was
amended so as to pyovide that the supreme court might "by
order from time to time, make and prescribe such general
rules of practice both at law and in equity, and regtulations
for the said supreme court and the government of the several
district courts, not inconsistent with the provisions of this act,
as it may deem proper." This provision continued in force
after Minnesota was admitted to the Union, until the revision
of 1866.
It will, consequently, be seen that in Minnesota and in the
jurisdictions from which she inherited her laws, as well as in
England and the -federal government, the power to regulate
procedure has been regarded not as an exclusively legislative
power, nor yet as an exclusively judicial power, but certainly
as a power properly within the judicial province when not
47
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Wis. Laws 1836 p. 35.
9 U. S. Statutes at Large 403, 408.
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otherwise directed by the legislature.
Supreme Court has said that it is for the state to determine
whether or not the legislative, executive and judicial powers
shall be kept altogether distinct and separate. 19 And the Minnesota supreme court is with the overwhelming weight of
authority when it says:
"But it is not always easy to discover the line which
marks the distinction between executive, judicial, and legislative functions, and when duties of an ambiguous character
are imposed upon a judicial officer, any doubt will be resolved
in favor of the validity of the statute, and the powers held
to be judicial." 50
It is, therefore, submitted that there is in Minnesota no
valid constitutional objection against the adoption of the proposal of the American Bar Association. Even the minor objection that the supreme court has no power to prescribe rules
for the government of inferior courts is covered by the foregoing history and authorities.
As may be gathered from what has already been said, the
proposal favors the Colorado plan of entrusting the entire subjects of pleading and practice to the courts, rather than the
New Jersey plan of having the legislature prescribe the general
principles and outline, leaving only the details to the courts.
If judicial control is to have a fair trial, there should be as
little legislative interference as possible.
The movement for the control of court procedure by rules
of court is growing. It is only a question of time when Congress will pass a bill embodying the principle. Six states
have already done so. Similar legislation has been recommended in New York by an official board of revision. 51 Many
state bar associations have, after full discussion, gone on
record in favor'of it. But it would be a mistake to adopt it
in any jurisdiction until the bench and bar thereof realize the
great responsibility thereby imposed upon them and are willing
to make the necessary sacrifices of time and labor to formulate
rules which shall be accurately phrased and scientifically
drafted so as to remedy old abuses and prevent new ones.
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49 Dreyer v. Illinois, (1902) 187 U. S. 71, 84, 47 L. Ed. 79.
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